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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal raises issues of first impression involving statutory construction and federal
preemption. Defendant-Appellant Scott B. Maybee ("Maybee"), an enrolled member of the
Seneca Nation of Indians, challenges the applicability of two Idaho statutes to sales made by him
from

an out-of-state Indian reservation: the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement

Complementary Act ("Complementary Act"), codified at Title 39, Chapter 84 of the Idaho Code,
and the Prevention of Minors' Access to Tobacco ("Minors' Access Act"), codified at Title 39,
Chapter 57 of the Idaho Code.

I.

Challenges to the Applicability of the Complementary Act
a.

Statutory Grounds for Dismissal

The Complementary Act was enacted to enforce the provisions of the Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement Act (the "MSA Act").

LC. § 39-8401. Both statutes regulate tobacco

manufacturers whose cigarettes are stamped and "sold in this state." Compare LC.§ 39-8403(1)
with I.C. § 39-7803. Neither the MSA Act nor the Complementary Act regulates unstamped
cigarettes lawfully sold in interstate commerce. Consequently, the District Court erred when it
found that Maybee had violated the Complementary Act by selling unstamped cigarettes in
interstate commerce to Idaho consumers. (R. 72).

b.

Constitutional Grounds for Dismissal

Congress has been given plenary power under the Indian Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution to regulate the affairs of Indians. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,

Boise-215497.1 0036346-00002
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490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). States Jaws are presumed inapplicable to regulate the on-reservation
conduct involving Indians, absence express congressional consent. White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).

The State has failed to demonstrate that

"exceptional circumstances" exist to overcome this presumption by showing that Maybee' s
conduct has off-reservation effects that impairs a significant state interest sought to be protected
by the Complementary Act. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 21415 (I 987); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983). Consequently,
the State is preempted from enforcing the Complementary Act against Maybee.
2.

Preemption Challenge to the Minors' Access Act's Permit Requirement.

Under the Minors' Access Act, tobacco retailers must possess a state permit before
selling tobacco products to Idaho consumers. LC.§§ 39-5704(1), 39-5718(1). Although the sale
or distribution of tobacco products without a permit is "considered by the state of Idaho as an
effort to subvert the state's public purpose to prevent minor's access to tobacco products," the
State has failed to show that Maybee's sales without a permit has the off-reservation effect of
subverting the State's "public purpose to prevent minor's access to tobacco products." LC. § 395709.

Absent an off-reservation effect, the State is preempted under the Indian Commerce

Clause from imposing a permit requirement on a Native American tobacco seller whose sales are
conducted on tribal land. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297,
1312 (D. Mont. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463, 480-481.
B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Maybee is an enrolled member of the Seneca Nation of Indians ("Seneca Nation"), a

Boise-215497.1 0036346-00002
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federally recognized Indian tribe whose tribal territory is located within western New York State.
(COE #6 ,r,r 2-3). The Seneca Nation has given Maybee a license to operate, as a sole proprietor,
a tobacco retail business on its Allegany Indian Territory. (COE #6

,rir 4, 6).

From his place of

business, Maybee sells cigarettes in interstate commen.:e to consumers, over the age of 21, for
their personal use and consumption. (COE #6 ,r 17).
Maybee has no offices, employees, sale representatives, agents, inventory or other
tangible property in Idaho.

(COE #6, iJ27).

Idaho consumers transmit their orders via the

Internet, by phone or by mail to Maybee at his place of business on the Seneca Nation territory.
(COE #6, iJ24).

Before an order is accepted, the customer's age, identity, and address are

verified in accordance with Maybee's business practices that ensure tobacco products are sold
only to adults for their own personal consumption. (COE #6,

,r,r 17-18).

The customers select

the method of mailing (i.e., priority mail or express mail), and pay all postage charges. (COE #6,

,r 24).

After Maybee receives the customer's payment, goods are packaged and picked up by the

U.S. Postal Service for mailing. (COE #6,

,r 24).

Once packages are given to the U.S. Postal

Service, they cannot be retrieved by Maybee. (COE #6, ,r 25). The U.S. Postal Service delivers
these orders to Idaho customers and obtains the customer's signature on all first orders. (COE
#6,

,r ,r 21,

24). Maybee conducts these non-face-to-face sales, commonly known as "delivery

sales," without leaving his place of business on the reservation. (COE #6, iJ25).
There are more than 1800 websites offering to sell tobacco products to Idaho consumers.
(COE #7, Ex. F &t !DAG 139650). Most of these sites do not report their delivery sales or
inform buyers of their responsibility to pay all applicable taxes.
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(COE #7, Ex. F at IDAG

139651).

Maybee is unlike most delivery sellers.

He reports all shipments of unstamped

cigarettes on a monthly basis to the State pursuant to the Jenkins Act, 15 U.S.C. § 376. (COE
#6, i\29). He informs Idaho consumers that they are responsible for the payment of all applicable
Idaho taxes and that it is illegal to sell or give tobacco products to minors. (COE #6, i!29, Ex.
A). Maybee, however, is the only delivery seller to have ever been sued by the State. (COE #7,
Exs. G - I).

C.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 22, 2006, the State filed its verified complaint with the District Court of

the Fourth Judicial District for the County of Ada ("District Court"). (R. 27). In its first cause of
action, the State alleges that Maybee violated the Complementary Act by selling and offering for
sale to Idaho consumers cigarettes not listed on a "directory" of all cigarette brands that are
approved for sale in the State (the "Directory"). (R. 17). In its second cause of action, the State
alleges that Maybee has violated the Minors' Access Act by making delivery sales without a
tobacco permit and by failure to comply with its notice and disclosure requirements. (R. 17-18).
After conducting discovery, the State did not contest Maybee's assertions that he complies with
these notice and disclosure requirements. (R. 43).
After hearing a motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, the Honorable Kathryn
A. Sticklen granted the State's motion for summary judgment in a Memorandum Decision issued

i

on October 31, 2007. (R. 4, 40). On February 26, 2008, Judge Sticklen denied Maybee's motion
for reconsideration. (R. 70). On the same day, a judgment was entered enjoining Maybee from
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selling cigarettes not listed on the Directory and from shipping cigarettes without a permit. (R.
77). On April 8, 2008, Maybee filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 80).
D.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
1.

Idaho's MSA Act and Complementary Act

In 1997, the Nation's four largest tobacco companies, Phillip Morris, R.J. Reynolds,
Lorillard and Brown & Williamson, dominated the market by selling 99.58350% of all cigarettes
sold in the United States. (COE #7, Ex.D 127). On November 23, 1998, the Attorneys General
of 46 states, five U.S. territories and the District of Columbia (the "Settling States") settled
various legal actions involving antitrust, product liability and consumer protection claims against
these leading tobacco manufacturers by entering into the Master Settlement Agreement. LC. §
39-7801(e); (COE #7, Ex. D i12); (COE #7, Ex. D at !DAG 139187). Idaho is one of the Settling
States under the Master Settlement Agreement. LC. § 39-7801(e). In exchange for releases of
past, present and certain future claims brought against them, these settling manufactures
("participating manufacturers") agreed "to pay substantial sums to the state (tied in part to their
volume of sales)." Id.
Under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, the State is obligated to enact and
enforce a "qualifying statute" that "effectively and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantage that
Participating Manufacturers experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers within such
Settling States as a result of the provisions" of the Master Settlement Agreement. (COE #7, Ex.
D il33). The settling parties attached to the Master Settlement Agreement a model qualifying
statute. (COE 7, Ex. D. at IDAG 139212). Most, if not all, Settling States have enacted the
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model qualifying statute that obligates non-participating manufacturers to make escrow
payments. 1 These qualifying statutes, however, only require escrow payments to be made. on the
number of cigarette "units sold" in a state, not the "units used" in a state.
In 1999, the State adopted the model qualified statute and enacted the MSA Act. (R. 9

,i7; COE #7, Ex. D i!36). The MSA Act imposes legal obligation only on tobacco manufacturers
and sets forth the procedure for a non-participating manufacturer "selling cigarettes to consumers
within the state" to make escrow payments.

LC. § 39-7803. Not all brands sold to Idaho

consumers are subject to escrow payments. Non-participating manufacturers are only required to
make escrow payments based on the number of"units sold" in the State.
"Units sold means the number of individual cigarettes sold in the state by the
applicable tobacco product manufacturer (where directly or through a distributor,
retailer or similar intermediary of intermediaries) during the year in question, as
measured by excise taxes collected by the state on packs (or "roll-your-own"
tobacco containers) bearing the excise tax stamps of the state....
LC. § 39-7802(j).

There are three important elements to the "units sold" definition:

(I)

"cigarettes sold in the state," (2) "as measured by excise taxes collected by the state," and (3)
"bearing the excise stamp of the state." Federal and state laws permit the sale of unstamped
cigarettes in interstate commerce. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314 (1992); IDAPA

1

Compare Idaho Code§ 39-7802 with Ala. Code§ 6-12-2; Alaska Stat. § 45.53.100; Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 44-7101;
Ark. Code Ann.§ 26-57-260; Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 104556; Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 4-28h; Del. Code§ 6081;
Ga. Code. Ann.§_ l0-13A-2; Haw. Rev. State.§ 675-2, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.168, par. JO (Smith-Hurd); Ind. Code§ 243-3-11; Iowa Code. Ann.§ 453C; Kan. State. Ann.§ 50-6a02; La. Rev. Stat. tit. 13 § 5062; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
22 § 1580-H; Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg.§ 16-501; Mich. Comp. Laws§ 445.2051; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 196,1000;
Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 69-2702; Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 370A.120; N.H. Rev. Stat.§ 541-C:2; N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 6-4-12; N.Y.
Pub. Health Law§ 1399-oo, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-290; N.D. Cent. Code § 51-25-01; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
1346.01; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 37 § 600.22; R.l. Gen. Law§ 23-71-2; S.C. Code Ann. § 11-47-20; Tenn. Code Ann. §
47-31-102; Utah Code Ann.§ 59-22-202; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 1913; Wash. Rev. Code§ 70.157.010; W. Va.
Code§ 16-9B-2; Wyo. Stat.§ 9-4-1201.
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35.01.10.013; IDAPA 35.01. 10.022. Unstamped cigarettes sold in interstate commerce are not
considered "cigarettes sold in the state" for purposes of the MSA Act. (COE# 7, Ex. D 'i!35).
Under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, the State is only required to
diligently enforce its own qualifying statute by requiring escrow payments for all "units sold" in
Idaho. (COE# 7, Ex. D 'i!33). The State, therefore, has no obligation to enforce New York's
qualifying statute or to collect escrow payments for units sold in New York.
A Settling State's failure to enact or diligently enforce its qualifying statute could subject
the Settling State, under certain circumstances, to a reduction in payments received from
participating manufacturers under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA
payments'). (COE# 7, Ex. D 'il'il 25-35). If participating manufacturers can show that the Master
Settlement Agreement has been a significant factor in their Joss of market share to nonparticipating manufacturers and that a Settling State has not enacted or diligently enforced its
qualifying statute, then participating manufacturers would be entitled to a downward adjustment
to their MSA payments. (Id.) This downward adjustment is known as an "NPM Adjustment."
(COE# 7, Ex. D 'ii 25).
In 2003, the Legislature found that violations of the MSA Act threatened not only the
integrity of the Master Settlement Agreement, but also the fiscal soundness of the State. l.C. §
39-8401. The Complementary Act was enacted so that non-participating tobacco manufacturers
could not avoid their escrow obligations under the MSA Act.

LC. § 39-8401. It imposes

obligations not only on tobacco manufacturers, but also on any "wholesaler, distributor, retailer,
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or similar intermediary or intermediaries" (collectively, "tobacco dealers") that distribute
cigarettes for sale in the state. LC. § 39-8403.
The Complementary Act requires "[ e]very tobacco manufacturer whose cigarettes are
sold in this state" to deliver a certification to the Idaho Attorney General containing a list of all
cigarette brands previously or currently being "sold in the state." LC. § 39-8403(1). From these
certifications, the Attorney General develops and publishes the Directory. l.C. § 39-8403(2).
Cigarettes not listed on the Directory may not be stamped, sold, offered or possessed "for sale in
this state." LC. § 39-8403(3); LC. § 39-8406(3).
Before a cigarette brand can be certified and approved for sale "in the state," the tobacco
manufacturer must either be a participating manufacturer or a non-participating manufacturer
that has agreed to make escrow payments based on the number of cigarettes "sold in the state."
LC. § 39-8403(2)(b). A participating manufacturer must "include in its certification a list of its
brand families" and affirm that listed brands are "deemed to be its cigarettes for purposes of
calculating its payment under the master settlement agreement." I.C. § 39-8403(1 )(a); LC. § 398403(1 )( d)(i). A non-participating manufacturer must include in its certification "a complete
list" of all brand families that were sold in the State at any time during the preceding or current
calendar year, along with the number of "units sold" for each brand. LC. § 39-8403(l)(b).

A

non-participating manufacturer must also affirm that listed brands are deemed cigarettes for
purposes of calculating its escrow payment under the MSA Act. LC. § 39-8403(1)(d)(ii).
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The Directory contains not only a complete list of brands that may be "sold in the State,"
but also the brands on which MSA and escrow payments will be made. The unit cost for
calculating escrow payments for non-participating manufacturers is the same for calculating
MSA payments for participating manufacturers. LC. § 39-7803(b)(2)(B). Thus, by requiring
non-participating manufacturers to make escrow payments based on the "units sold" in the State,
the MSA Act and Complementary Act "effectively and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantage
that Participating Manufacturers experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers within
such Settling State as a result of the provisions" of the Master Settlement Agreement. (COE #7,

Ex. D i)33, citing MSA § IX (d)(2)(E) [emphasis added]).

2.

Idaho's Minors' Access Act

The Legislature enacted the Minors' Access Act "to prevent the illegal sale, theft and
easy access of tobacco products to minors and to prohibit the possession, distribution and use of
tobacco products by minors." LC. § 39-5701. The Minors' Access Act regulates both face-toface sales and delivery sales to ensure that tobacco products are not sold to minors. LC. § 395703 through 39-5713 (regulates face-to-face sales); LC. § 39-5714 through 39-5718 (regulates
delivery sales).
The Minors' Access Act sets forth certain requirements for delivery sales, including age
verification requirements, disclosure and notice requirements, shipping requirements, registration
and reporting requirements, and appHcable tax collection requirements.
Intrastate delivery sales are also subject to:
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LC. § 39-5714(2).

all other laws of the state of Idaho generally applicable to sales of tobacco
products that occur entirely within Idaho, including, but not limited to, those laws
imposing excise taxes, sales and use taxes, licensing and tax stamping
requirements and escrow or other payment obligations.
Id. The Minors' Access Act further provides that "[p]rior to making delivery sales or shipping
tobacco products in connection with such sales," a delivery seller must obtain a state tobacco
permit from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. LC.§ 39-5718(1).
According to the State, "[t]he permit requirement contributes to the State's effort at
controlling the ability of minors to obtain tobacco by ensuring that [the State] has a central
repository of all businesses marketing tobacco to Idaho residents with a uniform set of data
which facilitates compliance monitoring and, where necessary, enforcement actions." (COE # 8
at p. 18). In applying for a tobacco permit, a delivery seller is required to provide "a statement
setting forth the seller's name, trade name and the address of the business's principal place of
business and any other place of business." l.C. § 39-5718(1). The Jenkins Act similarly requires
an out-of-state delivery seller to "file with the tobacco tax administrator of the State into which
such shipment is made ... a statement setting forth his name and trade name (if any), and the
address of his principal place of business and of any other place of business." 15 U.S.C. §
376(a)(l).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ON APPEAL

l.

Are the provisions of the Complementary Act, which makes it unlawful for a

person "[t]o sell, offer, or possess for sale in this state, cigarettes of a tobacco product
manufacturer or brand family not included in the directory" applicable to a Native American
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tobacco seller who makes delivery sales without leaving his place of business on an out-of-state
Indian reservation?
2.

Is the provision of the Minors' Access Act, which requires a delivery seller to

obtain a tobacco permit before making a delivery sale to an Idaho consumer, pre-empted under
federal law when enforcement is sought against an out-of-state Native American delivery seller
who mails tobacco products from an out-of-state reservation only to adult consumers, and then
reports those shipments each month to the State?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Constitutional issues are purely questions of law; therefore, this Court exercises free
review over such issues. Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 13 l Idaho 258, 260, 954 P.2d 676, 678
(1998). This Court also freely reviews issues of statutory interpretation. Big Sky Paramedics,
LLC v. Sagle Fire Dist., 140 Idaho 435,436, 95 P.3d 53, 54 (2004).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMPLEMENTARY ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO DELIVERY
SALES MADE FROM AN OUT-OF-STATE INDIAN RESERVATION

A.

Applying Conventional Rules of Statutory Construction, Maybee Cannot Be
Found in Violation of the Complementary Act.

The State argued to the District Court that Maybee is subject to the Complementary Act
because he "introduces noncompliant tobacco into the State." (COE #8 at pp. 10, 13).
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Undisputedly, Maybee has sold in interstate commerce unstamped cigarettes not listed on the
Directory to Idaho consumers.

However, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the pivotal

question is not whether Maybee has "introduce[d] ... into the State" cigarettes not listed on the
Directory, but whether these cigarettes were ever "sold in the State."
1.

The MSA Act and the Complementary Act Are In Pari Materia and
Must Be Applied Harmoniously and Consistently with Each Other.

The Legislature enacted the Complementary Act as a "procedural enhancement" to the
enforcement of the MSA Act. J.C. § 39-8401. Both statutes require "cigarettes sold in the state"
to be manufactured by tobacco companies that are either participating manufacturers or nonparticipating manufacturers that have filed annual certifications with the Idaho Attorney General
attesting to the "number of units sold in the state" on which they have made escrow payments.
Compare§ I.C. 39-8403 (l) with I.C. § 39-7803. Because the statutes relate to the same subject
matter, the MSA Act and the Complementary Act are in part mater/a and must be construed
together to effect their legislative intent. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway
Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003). No provision within either statute, however,
should be construed as redundant or superfluous. State v. Folsom, 139 Idaho 626, 630, 84 P.3d
563, 566 (2003).
The District Court failed to recognized that the MSA Act and the Complementary Act are
in part mater/a and must be construed together to effect their legislative intent. See Sandpoint,

139 Idaho at 69, 72 P.3d at 909. Construed as a whole, these statutes create a "complementary
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and cohesive" scheme regulating the sale of stamped cigarettes in intrastate commerce.

In

rejecting this argument, the District Court wrote:
The Court is not persuaded that Maybee had a reasonable belief that the
[Complementary Act] applied only to "units sold" measured by "excise taxes
collected by the State on packs ... bearing the excise tax stamp of the state."
Idaho Code§ 39-7802(j). Idaho Code§ 39-7802(j) is part of the [Complementary
Act], which applies only to manufacturers. However, the [Complementary Act]
clearly makes it unlawful for anyone to sell cigarettes of manufacturers or
families not included on the directory, not "units sold."
(R. 74-75) (emphasis added). The District Court accepted the State's arguments that:
[t]he Complementary Act .. .is much broader in scope because it prohibits the
sale of non-compliant cigarettes, a tenn that incorporates both stamped cigarettes
(units sold) and unstamped cigarettes.
(COE #8 at p. 23). It also rejected Maybee's argument that the word "cigarettes" cannot be read
in isolation or in contravention of the "complementary and cohesive" scheme enacted by the
Legislature. (R. 74-75).
The Complementary Act was enacted so that non-participating tobacco manufacturers
could not avoid their escrow obligations under the MSA Act.

I.C. § 39-8401.

It imposes

obligations not only on tobacco manufacturers, but also on "tobacco dealers" that distribute
cigarettes for sale in the state. LC. § 39-8403. Under the Complementary Act, no person may
not stamp, sell, offer or possess cigarettes not listed on the Directory "for sale in this state." LC.
§ 39-8403(3); LC. § 39-8406(3).

Because the MSA Act only requires non-participating manufacturers to make escrow
payments for units sold in the State, the Complementary Act only requires non-participating
manufacturers "whose cigarettes are sold in this state" to certify those brands previously or
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currently being "sold in the state." See LC. § 39-7803; LC. § 39-8403(1). The Directory,
therefore, does not list all cigarette brands intended for sale in the United States or available for
sale outside of the State.
In its motion for summary judgment, the State made three significant concessions. First,
the State conceded that the MSA Act only requires escrow payments based on the number of
cigarettes stamped for sale in the State. (COE #8 at p. 23). Second, the State admitted that Idaho
tax stamps are not affixed on cigarettes sold in interstate commerce, on military bases, or by
Indians on Indian reservations. (COE #7, Ex. D i/35).

Finally, the State acknowledges that

Maybee may lawfully ship unstamped cigarettes to Idaho consumers for their personal use and
consumption. (COE #8 at p.21); LC. § 63-2512(b). 2 Since Maybee may lawfully sell unstamped
cigarettes in interstate commerce, those sales, as the State has conceded, do not trigger the
application of the MSA Act. Despite these concessions, the State argues that the Complementary
Act limits Maybee's ability to "introduce" or "market non-compliant tobacco for delivery to
Idaho consumers." (COE #8 at p. 13).
The Legislature has made clear that the Complementary Act was only enacted to prevent
violations of the MSA Act.

LC. § 39-8401. By restricting tobacco dealers from stamping,

2

Out-of-state tobacco sellers that have no substantial nexus to the State cannot be required to collect or
remit taxes on their interstate sales. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Cigarettes sold in intrastate
commerce, however, must bear an Idaho tax stamp. State law do not prohibit an Idaho consumer from
purchasing gng carton (10 packs or less) of unstamped cigarettes from an out-of-state delivery seller.
Accord J.C.§ 63-2512 (\,). Because. the State restricts the number of cigarettes that may be purchased in
interstate commerce without restricting the number of cigarettes that may be purchased in intrastate
commerce, it discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate commerce. Quill, 504 U.S. 298;
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). Since this issue was not raised in the District Court, Maybee does
not challenge in this appeal the provisions of J.C.§ 63-2512 (b) which allows Idaho consumers to acquire
only one carton of unstamped cigarette from a delivery seller.
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selling, offering or possessing non-compliant brands for sale in the State, the Complementary
Act is the procedural mechanism employed by the State to diligently enforce of the MSA Act.
LC. § 39-8403(3); I.C. 39-8406. Nothing in the Complementary Act, however, suggests that the
Legislature intended the Complementary Act to be "much broader in scope" than the MSA Act.
In fact, the Complementary Act states that if a court of competent jurisdiction finds that the
provisions of the two acts conflict and cannot be harmonized, then the provisions of the MSA
Act should control. I.C. § 39-8407(7). Consequently, the State's assertions that the Legislature
intended the Complementary Act to be "much broader in scope" than the MSA Act must be
rejected.
2.

The Legislature Did Not Intend the MSA Act and the Complementary
Act to Regulate Sales Made by an Out-of-State Delivery Seller.

As this Court has repeatedly held, a statute must be construed to give effect to its
legislative intent. See, ~, Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 149 P.3d 833 (2006);
Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69, 72 P.3d at 909; Folsom, 139 Idaho 626 at 84 P.3d at 666. The Court
"must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Id.
Under the Complementary Act, it is unlawful for any person to affix an Idaho tax stamp
on cigarettes not listed on the Directory. LC. § 39-8403(3)(a). Under Idaho law, Idaho tax
stamps are affixed to cigarettes that are sold, offered or possessed "for sale in this state." Accord
LC. § 63-2508. Tax stamps, however, are not affixed to cigarettes sold in interstate commerce,
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on a military base, or by Indians on an Indian reservation.

IDAPA 35.01.10.013; IDAPA

35.01 .10.014; ID APA 35.01.10.022.
Construed as a whole and m harmony with the provisions of the MSA Act, the
Complementary Act only regnlates the intrastate sales of stamped cigarettes. Under the MSA
Act, non-participating manufacturers are only required to make escrow payments on the number
of cigarettes stamped for sale in the State. LC.§ 39-7803(b)(l). Under the Complementary Act,
non-participating manufacturers must certified those brands previously or currently sold and
stamped in the State upon which escrow payments have been or will be collected. LC. § 398403(l)(b). Since the Complementary Act was enacted to prevent a violation of the MSA Act,
the Court should construe the Complementary Act as applicable to only intrastate sales of
cigarettes stamped for sale in the State. Since the undisputed facts in this case show that Maybee
lawfully sells unstamped cigarettes in interstate commerce to Idaho consumers, Maybee cannot
be found in violation of the Complementary Act.
a.

Maybee lawfully sells unstamped cigarettes in interstate commerce.

Out-of-state delivery sellers that have no substantial nexus to the State cannot be required
to collect or remit taxes on goods sold in interstate commerce to Idaho consumers. Quill, 504
U.S. at 314. Because Maybee has no offices, employees, sale representatives, agents, inventory
or other tangible property in Idaho, the State does not dispute that he is not required to collect or
remit state cigarette taxes. (COE #6 i]27; COE #8 at p. 21). Under Idaho law, Idaho consumers
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may purchase unstamped cigarettes in an interstate transaction. Accord LC. § 63-2512(b). 3 The
State has conceded that unstamped cigarettes sold in interstate commerce do not trigger the
application of the MSA Act. (COE #8 at p. 23; COE #7, Ex. D 135). Since the Complementary
Act was enacted to prevent a violation of the MSA Act, the Court must conclude that the
Legislature did not intend interstate sales of unstamped cigarettes to be regulated by either the
MSA Act or the Complementary Act.
The State argues that Maybee's sales are regulated by the Complementary Act because he
"introduces non-compliant tobacco into the State." (COE #8 at p. 13). The Complementary Act,
however, does not state that it is unlawful for a person to "introduce," a person outside of the
State to "export," or a person within the State to "import" cigarettes not listed on the Directory
into the State.

This is yet another indication that the Legislature did not intend the

Complementary Act to regulate interstate commerce or Maybee's delivery sales of unstamped
cigarettes.
b. Maybee does not offer or possess cigarettes for sale in Idaho.

The State charges Maybee with a violation of Idaho Code§ 39-8403(3)(b). This section
of the Complementary Act provides that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o sell, offer or possess for sale in this
state, cigarettes of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in
the directory.
Since the Complementary Act applies only to intrastate sales of cigarettes stamped for sale in the
State, LC.§ 39-8403(3)(b) should be interpreted to mean no person shall "sell, offer, or possess"
' See discussion in footnote 2.
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cigarettes not listed on the Directory "for sale in this state." Under this interpretation, the State
would prohibit in-state tobacco sellers from keeping cigarettes not listed on the Directory in their
storerooms, warehouses or other locations where cigarettes "possessed for sale" are generally
kept. This provision would also prohibit in-state tobacco sellers from offering or displaying for
sale cigarettes not listed on the Directory in their stores or outlets.
The State does not claim that Maybee has "possess[ed] for sale in the state" any
cigarettes. (R. 18 ,JI).

Instead, the State claims that Maybee has violated this provision by

offering for sale in Idaho cigarettes not listed on the Directory. (R. 18 ,Jl ).
The Complementary Act does not define the word "offer" or the phrase "offer for sale."
The State asserts that Maybee offers non-compliant cigarettes to Idaho consumers by advertising
over the Internet and through the mail. (COE #3, Bxs. C and D). The word "offer" and the
phrase "offer for sale" cannot be interpreted to mean "advertise for sale." The United States
Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution pre-empts
any state law or regulation that restricts or prohibits the advertising of any cigarettes, the package
of which is labeled in conformity with the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
("FCLAA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550-51

(2001). Since the Legislature is presumed to have acted within its constitutional authority, this
Court must construe this provision in a manner that would render the statute constitutional.
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 814, 135 P.3d 756, 760 (2006).
Maybee, therefore, cannot be found in violation of the Complementary Act simply because he
advertises to Idaho consumers cigarettes not listed on the Directory.
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In construing the Complementary Act as the whole, this Court should conclude that the
word "offer" as used in § 39-8403 (3) (b) of the Complementary Act is modified by the phrase
"for sale in this state."

In discussing the penalty for a violation of the provision, the

Complementary Act states that "[a]ny cigarettes that have had stamps affixed, been sold, offered
for sale or possessed for sale in this state in violation of section 39-8403(3) shall be deemed

contraband ... and such cigarettes sha1l be subject to seizure and forfeiture .... " LC. § 398406 (3).

Because the State lacks the constitutional power to seize cigarettes possessed and

offered for sale outside of Idaho, only cigarettes possessed and offered "for sale in this state in
violation of section 39-8403(3)" may "be subject to seizure and forfeiture." More importantly, if
the Complementary Act does not regulate cigarettes sold in interstate commerce, then it would
be inconsistent to hold that the Complementary Act regulates cigarettes "offered for sale" in
interstate commerce. The Complementary Act, therefore, only prohibits cigarettes not listed on
the Directory from being offered "for sale in this state." Since Maybee does not possess or offer
cigarettes "for sale in this state," he cannot be found in violation of§ 39-8403(3)(b) of the
Complementary Act.
c. Maybee does not sell cigarettes in Idaho.

From the perspective of the Complementary Act, one fact in this case is indisputable Maybee does not sell in intrastate commerce. He engages in interstate sales of unstamped
cigarettes to Idaho consumers. Despite the State's concession that unstamped cigarettes sold in
interstate commerce are not "units sold in the State," the District Court held that Maybee violated
the Complementary Act because "the sales in questions do take place in Idaho." (R. 45).
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Although Maybee cited another Idaho statute, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, to support his claim that his sales do not take place in the State, neither the District Court
nor the State cited any legal authority on the situs of sale issue. Instead, both the District Court
and the State merely rejected the authority relied upon by Maybee to show that, as a matter of
law, his delivery sales take place outside ofidaho. (R. 44-45, 71, 74-75; COE #8 at pp. 4-9).
i.

Maybee 's sales take place outside of Idaho in accordance
with the Uniform Commercial Code.

Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), codified as Title 28, Chapter 2 of
the Idaho Code, governs the sales of goods in Idaho. A sale is defined under the U.C.C. as the
passing of title from a seller to a buyer for a price. I.C. § 28-2-106(1). Black's Law Dictionary
(5 th Ed.) similarly defines a sale as:
A contract between two parties, called, respectively, the "seller" (or vendor) and
the "buyer" (or the purchaser), by which the former, in consideration of the
payment or promise of payment of a certain price in money, transfers to the latter
the title and the possession of property.
Since the Complementary Act regulates only "cigarettes sold in the state," it has no applicability
to cigarette sales made by an out0 of-state seller when title and possession of such cigarettes
passes outside ofidaho.
In a delivery sale, a consumer places an order with the seller with the expectation that
goods will be "delivered" to the consumer. I.C. § 39-5702(2). Absent an explicit agreement to
the contrary, the Legis_ lature has determined that, when .a seller is authorized
to send goods to a
.
buyer and delivers such goods to a carrier, such as the United States Postal Service, title to the
goods passes from the seller to the buyer at the time aad place of shipment, thereby completing
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the sale transaction. l.C. § 28-2-401 (2)(a). Since cigarettes are delivered to United States Postal
Service for mailing outside of Idaho, Maybee's delivery sales take place outside of Idaho.
Neither the District Court nor the State disputed this U.C.C. interpretation.
The District Court erroneously adopted the State's argument that the U.C.C. does not
apply to "public" regulations such as the Complementary Act. (R. at 44-45, 71; COE #8 at pp 46). The District Court arrived at its conclusion by misinterpreting an official comment that
follows LC.§ 28-2-401, which reads as follows:
This section, however, in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation
should be followed in cases where the applicability of "public" regulation
depends upon a "sale" or upon the location of "title" without further definition.
This official comment speaks to situations where prior case law dealing with public regulations
may now conflict with the provisions of LC.§ 28-2-401.
Prior to a state's adoption of the U.C.C., state courts may have decided cases where the
applicability of "public" regulation depends upon a "sale" or upon the location of "title." The
official comment was added by the drafters to signify that LC. § 28-2-401 did not intend for
those prior cases to be ignored for purposes of deciding when or where a "sale" takes place. The
official comments merely state that it is for a court to decide "which line of interpretation should
be followed."
Although the U.C.C. sets forth the "right, obligation and remedies of the seller, buyer,
purchasers or other third parties" with regards to the sale of good "irrespective of title," the
drafter recognized that there are situations where "matters concerning title becomes material."
LC. § 28-2-401. As the official comment later states,
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[i]t is therefore necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under this
Article in case the courts deems any public regulation to incorporate the defined
term of the "private" law. 4
The official comment, therefore, contemplates that courts may look to the U.C.C. to guide them
in deciding if, when, or where a sale has occurred to determine the applicability of a public
regulation.
Because the Complementary Act makes it unlawful for any person to sell, offer, or
possess cigarettes not listed on the Directory "for sale in this state," the Court must decide
whether this provision is applicable to Maybee's delivery sales. I.C. § 39-8403(3)(b). Because
this is an issue of first impression, the Court does not have the benefit of prior case law.
Therefore, it is appropriate for this Court to be guided by the provisions of Idaho Code § 28-2401.
Both the District Court and the State ignored the fact that this Court has, as other state
courts have, applied this U.C.C. section to public regulations. This Court cited, as authority,
Idaho Code § 28-2-401 to determine whether a "sale at retail" had occurred, requiring the
collection of Idaho sales taxes. Old West Reality, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 110 I 546,
548-49, 716 P.2d 1318, 1320-21 (1986).

The appeal was brought to challenge the Tax

Commission's determination that the transfer of multiple listing booklets from a listing service to
real estate brokers was a taxable event under the Idaho Sales Tax Act. The Idaho Sales Tax Act
imposes a sales tax on all "sales at retail" of tangible property. Id. at 548, 716 P.2d at 1320. The

4

The term "private" Jaw means a law that determines the rights, obligations and remedies between private
individuals, as opposed to "public" laws that determines the rights and obligations of members of the public, as well
as the penalties for the breach of such public obligations.
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listing service claimed that multiple listing booklet was provided as a service, not a sale, to real
brokers who subscribed to its monthly service. Id. This Court disagreed and held that the
"delivery" of multiple listing booklets was a "sale at retail" of tangible property under the U.C.C.
Id. at 548-49, 716 P.2d at 1320-21 (citing LC.§ 28-2-401).
State courts have often decided tax liability issues involving the sale of goods with
reference to the U.C.C. See, "'-&, Franklin Fibre-Lamitex Coro. v. Director of Revenue, 505
A.2d 1296, 1298 (Del. Sup. 1985); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 439
Mass. 629, 635 (2003); In re Valley Media, Inc., 226 Fed. Appx, 120, 122-123 (3d Cir. 2007).
For example, in Franklin Fibre-Lamitex, a Delaware tax statute imposed upon wholesalers a
gross receipt tax on all goods "sold within this State." 505 A.2d at 1298. The phrase "sold
within this State" was not expressly defined in the tax statute. Id. The court found it "therefore
permissible to look to related statutes and principles of statutory construction to detennine its
meaning." Id. The Delaware court went on to state that:
the draftsmen of the U.C.C. anticipated that courts would use§ 2-401 in situations
where the passage of title is important. "It is therefore necessary to state what a
'sale' is and when title passes under this Article in case the courts deem any
public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the 'private' law." U.C.C. §
2-401 Official Comment (1978).
Id. at 1299.
Similarly, California courts have cited to U.C.C. § 2-401 to determine the applicability of
its "lemon" law. See,"'-&, Carlson v. Monaco Coach Corp, 486 F. Supp_.2d 1127, 1 BO (E.D.
Cal. 2007); California State Electronics Assn. v. Zeos Internal. Ltd., 41 Cal App.4
Cal. Rptr.2d 127 (1996).
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Consumer Warranty Act, a public regulation that is expressly limited to consumer goods sold in
California. In Zeos, the California court held that the California statute did not apply to goods
shipped by a Minnesota retailer to a buyer in California. Id. at 1277, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 132. The
court found that title passed at the place of shipment in Minnesota pursuant to V.C.C. § 2-401.
Id. In Carlson, a recreational vehicle had been purchased from a California RV dealer for
delivery to the purchasers in Nevada. 486 F. Supp. at 1128. The California dealer asserted that
the purchasers wanted delivery in Nevada to avoid payment of California sales taxes. Id. The
court, however, looked to V.C.C. § 2-401 to determine the situs of sale. Id. at 1130. The court
found that the parties had agreed that the dealer would ship the vehicle to Nevada, but did not
require the dealer to make the delivery at the Nevada destination. Id. at 1131. Consequently, the
federal court held that the sale took place when the vehicle was shipped from California pursuant
to U.C.C. § 2-401. The transaction, therefore, was covered by the California warranty statute.
Id. at 1132.
In S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Barilka Brewers, 443 F. Supp.2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), a New
York beer wholesaler brought an action in federal court against a Russian brewery, claiming the
cancellation of a distribution agreement without notice violated the New York Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law, a public regulation. The federal court ruled that New York statute was
applicable to breweries that "sell or offer to sell beer" in New York State. Relying upon U.C.C.
§ 2-401, the federal court ruled that the New York wholesale had no cause of action under the

Alcoholic Beverage Control Law because all sales between the New York wholesaler and the
Russian brewery took place at the point of shipment in Russia.
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As a rule of statutory construction, the Legislature is presumed to know of other statutes
in existence at the time a given statute was passed. Folsom, 139 Idaho at 630, 279 P .2d at 630.
Article 2 of the U.C.C. had already been enacted when the Legislature passed the
Complementary Act.

The Legislature intended the Complementary Act to only regulate

cigarettes "for sale in this state." If the Legislature intended the phrase "for sale in this state" to
have a different meaning than that given by LC. § 28-2-401, then the phrase would have been
defined, as other words and phrases have been defined, in LC. § 39-8402. Absent a contrary
definition, the Court should give the usual and common place meaning to phrase "for sale in this
state" and conclude that Maybee's delivery sales do not take place in this State.
ii.

Maybee cannot be iudiciatlv estoeped from asserting that
his sales take place outside ofldaho.

In the support of its motion for summary judgment, the State offered as evidence an out
of context statement from an affidavit signed and filed by Maybee in another, unrelated lawsuit
in New York. (COE# 3, Ex. B). See Day Wholesale, Inc. v. State of New York, 51 A.D.3d 383,
856 N.Y.S.2d 808 (2008). Maybee and a New York wholesaler (the "Plaintiffs") commenced
the action in Day to obtain an order declaring that a 2005 amendment to the New York Tax Law
("2005 Amendment") had not gone into effect and enjoining New York and its Attorney General
from enforcing the amendment prior to its effective date. Id. at 384, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 808. The
2005 Amendment required New York wholesalers to affix New York tax stamps on all cigarettes
sold at wholesale on Indian reservations located within New York. Id. at 386, 856 N.Y.S.2d at
809. The Plaintiffs argued that the 2005 Amendment had not gone into effect because the Tax
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Department had not taken the necessary administrative steps to implement the legislative
scheme, including the issuance of tax-exemption coupons. Id. The Plaintiffs were successful in
obtaining a preliminary injunction. Id.
Maybee signed and submitted an affidavit in support of the Plaintiffs' motion for
preliminary injunction. In his affidavit, Maybee stated:
Approximately 75% of my retail sales are to out-of-state purchasers. These sales
are completed in the home state of the purchaser once their orders have been
delivered through the mails. U.C.C. § 2-401. These out-of-state shipments are
not intended for resale in the purchaser's home state, but are retail sales intended
for the purchaser's personal use and consumption.
Under the Interstate
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, these out-of-state purchasers
are exempt from the imposition of New York sales and excise taxes since both the
sale and use take place outside of the State. Accord 20 N.Y.C.C.R. § 76.3.
(COE# 3, Ex. B i]9). The first and third sentences of this statement are factual allegations made
by Maybee based on his own personal knowledge. The statements citing legal authority in the
second and last sentences, however, are legal conclusions based on an erroneous opinion given to
Maybee by his attorney. (COE #7 ill 6).
The State offered Maybee's New York affidavit as "evidence of his understanding that
title transfers in Idaho." (COE #8 at p. 8). The State also speculated that "this statement was
apparently made to assist [Maybee] in avoiding the imposition or payment of New York taxes."
(Id.)

The District Court accepted as fact the State's unsupported assertions that Maybee's

statement was made "to avoid the payment of New York State taxes on his sales." (R. 71). The
court also found Maybee's "admission" to be "most telling." (R. 45). The District Court held
that Maybee was "judicially estopped from asserting here that all of his sales take place on the
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Seneca reservation" and later reaffirmed its findings that "Maybee's sales take place in Idaho."
(R. 45, 71).

Maybee made the statement to show that his sales to "out-of-state purchasers are exempt
from the imposition of New York sales and excise taxes" under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
As a matter oflaw, this statement is true, but not because these sales take place in the home state
of the purchasers, but because New York does not have jurisdiction to tax "out-of-state
purchasers" who are not in New York at time of the sale. In re State Tax on Foreign-Held Bond,
82 U.S. 300, 319 (1872) ("The power of taxation, however vast in its character and searching in
its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the State.") In order words,
a state cannot tax a good sold in interstate commerce if the person or entity obligated to pay the
tax does not have a nexus to the taxing state. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 279 (1977). Maybee's statement, therefore, was not made "to avoid the payment of New
York State taxes on his sales" because New York taxes do not apply to delivery sales made to
out-of-state purchasers. For these same reasons, the State has acknowledged that it does not
collect cigarette taxes on tobacco products sold in interstate commerce. (COE #7, Ex. D ,J35).
Consequently, Idaho delivery sellers would not be required to affix Idaho tax stamps on
cigarettes shipped to New York residents. IDAPA 35.01.10.013; IDAPA 35.01.10.022.
The State claims that Maybee's statement is "evidence of his understanding" that sales
.are completed in the home state of the purchaser. (COE #8 at p. 8). Maybee's understanding as
to the situs of sale is not controlling; it is the understanding between the parties to the sale, which
is controlling. In reviewing his statement, Maybee does not claim that the sales take place in the
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purchaser's home state because of an explicit agreement with the purchaser. As the District
Court noted in its first Memorandum Decision and Order, "[n]o 'contract' appears in the record."
(R. 44). When a seller is authorized to ship the goods to the buyer, but the seller is not required
to personally deliver the goods to the buyer, the sale is completed when the goods are given to a
common carrier or the U.S. Postal Service. LC. § 28-2-401(2)(a). The District Court and the
State did not dispute this interpretation of U.C.C. § 2-401. Instead, both the District Court and
the State expressed doubts as to its applicability to public regulations such as the Complementary
Act. (R. at 44-45, 71; COE #8 at pp 4~6). 5
Ironically, the District Court found Maybee's eJToneous interpretation of the U.C.C. to be
more "telling" than the coJTect interpretation. Despite undisputed evidence to the contrary, the
District Court found that "Maybee's sales take place in Idaho."

The court reached this

conclusion by misapplying the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
This Court adopted the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76
Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954).

In Loomis, this Court held that a litigant who obtains a

judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through means of a sworn statement is
judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, to obtain a
recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter.
Id. at 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565. Judicial estoppel "precludes a party from gaining an advantage by
taking one position, and then seeking a second adva_ntage by taking an incompatible position."
McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997) (quoting Rissetto v.
5

Previously discussed on pages 28 through 33 of this brief.
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Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1996)0. When appropriately
applied, judicial estoppel promotes the orderly administration of justice and regard for the
dignity of judicial proceedings. Id. (citing Rissetto, 94 F.3d at 601). Judicial estoppel prevents
litigants from playing fast and loose with the courts. Id.
The extraordinary remedy of judicial estoppel has only been cautiously applied under
exceptional circumstances. A court may only invoke this remedy when a prior sworn statement
(I) made deliberately by an litigant, without mistake, fraud or duress, and (2) from which the
litigant obtained a judgment, advantage, or consideration in the prior proceeding, (3) is now
repudiated by the litigant in a subsequent proceeding (4) arising out of the same transaction or
subject matter. Loomis, 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565; McKay, 130 Idaho at 152-53, 937 P.2d at 122627; Heinze v. Baurer, 145 Idaho 232, _, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008). These conditions ensure a
tight fit between the party's earlier success gained by a prior sworn statement and the success
sought to be gained by a later inconsistent statement, such that an inequity arises. None of these
conditions are present in this case.
As this Court recently stated in Heinze, judicial estoppel does not apply to a litigant who
wishes to repudiate a position inadvertently made due to a mistake. Id. at _, 178 P .3d at 600
(citing McKay. 130 Idaho at 153,937 P.2d at 1227).
For guidance purposes and to avoid misapplication of judicial estoppel, it should
be made clear that the concept should only be applied when the party maintaining
the inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge
of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another way,
the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states
under oath in open court, but also what that pai;ty knew, or should have known, at
the time the original position was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the party
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possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is
determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with the court.
Id. at_, 178 P.3d at 600-01 (citing McKay, 130 Idaho at 155, 937 P.2d at 1229). Cf. A&J
Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 687, 116 P.3d 12, 17 (2005) ("[F]ollowing the advice of
counsel is not equivalent to inadvertence or mistake" if it appears to have been a strategic
decision made in preparation of a petition in the prior proceeding.).

In this case, Maybee

inadvertently made his prior inconsistent statement based on an erroneous legal opinion given to
him by his attorney, which gave him no strategic advantage in the prior case. (COE #7 i\16).
Consequently, he should not be judicially estopped from correcting this legal mistake.
Maybee is not attorney and, therefore, must rely upon the legal advice and opinions given
to him by his attorneys. (COE #7 i\16). His statement that his sales take place in the purchaser's
home state was not intended to be a factual allegation, but a legal conclusion to which he cited
legal authority. (COE #3, Ex. B i\9). In a motion for summary judgment, "legal conclusions
(especially by laymen)" are not factual statements based on the affiant' s personal knowledge and
should not be considered for purposes of summary judgment.

Tri-State National Bank v.

Western Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543, 547, 447 P.2d 409, 413 (1968); 2A C.J.S.
Affidavits § 64 ("Statements which constitute the opinion or belief of the affiant, or matters
outside the personal knowledge of the affiant, are not 'competent evidence."'); 2A C.J.S.
Affidavits § 39 ("It is improper for affidavits to embody legal arguments, and legal arguments
and summations in affidavits will be disregarded by the courts."). Moreover, Maybee's legal
opinion does not alter the undisputed facts of this case. Maybee accepts and fills orders from
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Idaho consumers without leaving his place of business on the Seneca Nation Allegany Indian
Territory. His last act is to deliver these unstamped cigarettes -- outside of Idaho -- to the United
States Postal Service. These undisputed facts should control the outcome of the case - not an
erroneous legal conclusion given to Maybee by his attorney.
Even if this Court were to conclude that Maybee should have ]mown whether his
statement was legally accurate prior to adopting it as part of his New York affidavit, the
statement was not a factor that contributed to his success in ·the New York litigation. Every
reported Idaho case that has invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppels has only permitted its
application when the "judgment, advantage, or consideration" was obtained because of the prior
sworn statement. See,~, Loomis, 76 Idaho at 93, 277 P.2d at 564-65 (an injured passenger
received a settlement from a truck driver after claiming that her driver was free of any fault, but
then sued her driver claiming that he went through a stop sign); Jensen v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 78 Idaho 145, 149,298 P.2d 976, 978-79 (1956) (fanner, who obtained a default
judgment against a warehouse claiming that his delivery of wheat constituted a sale, was
estopped from claiming that the delivery was a bailment so as to collect on the warehouse's
surety bond); McKay, 130 Idaho at 155, 937 P.2d at 1230 (in a proceeding to approval an infant
settlement, a mother told the court that she understood and consented to the settlement and was
later estopped from claiming that the case was settled without her consent); Wood, l 41 Idaho at
687, 116 P.3d at 17 (real estate speculator was judicial estopped from pursuing a claim against a
joint venture after failing to list the claim as an asset in his bankruptcy petition); Heinze, 145
Idaho at _, 178 P .3d at 600 (husband who told a divorce court that he was prepared to accept
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the terms of a divorce settlement could not sue his attorney for legal malpractice because he was
unhappy with some of its provisions).
Maybee's sworn statement made no difference to the outcome of the New York litigation,
which is not only evident from the decision issued in Day, but also from the fact that the trial
court in Day allowed the statement to be expunged from the record and allowed a new affidavit
to be filed nunc pro tune. Accord Day, 51 A.D.3d 383, 856 N.Y.S.2d 808; (see also, COE #13,
Ex. 2). In its Order, the trial court in Day specifically stated that it found:
no substantial rights of any party [was] affected by the granting of the Plaintiffs'
motion and that the two sentences being removed from paragraph 9 of the 2006
Affidavit did not form a basis for any of the Court's previous rulings or orders in
this case ....
(COE #13, Ex. 2).
Finally, judicial estoppel applies only when a prior sworn statement is sought to be used
in a subsequent proceedings arising out of the same transaction or subject matter as the prior
proceeding. Loomis, 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565. The transactions at issue and subject matter in this
case have no relationship to the transaction or subject matter of the Day case. This action
involves the applicable of the Complementary Act to retail delivery sales made in interstate
commerce to Idaho consumers. Day involved whether amendments to New York Tax Law
affecting a wholesale transaction made in New York State had gone into effect. Since Maybee's
prior statement did not involve the same transaction or subject matter, the District Court
misapplied the doctrine of judicial estoppel in granting the State's motion for summary
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judgment. As the undisputed facts of this case show, Maybee's delivery sales take place outside
ofldaho.

d. Maybee only sells cigarettes for a consumer's personal use and
consumption.
The undisputed evidence also shows that Maybee has only sold cigarettes to Idaho
consumers for their personal use and consumption. Idaho consumers who possess unstamped
cigarettes for their own personal use and consumption are not subject to the regulations imposed
by the MSA Act or the Complementary Act.

See I.C. § 39-7803; I.C. § 39-8403.

If the

Legislature intended to restrict Idaho consumers from purchasing unstamped cigarettes not listed
on the Directory in interstate commerce, it could have easily accomplished this objective. By
removing the phrase "for sale," § 39-8403(3)(b) of the Complementary Act would have simply
stated that no person may "sell, offer, or possess in this state, cigarettes" not listed on the
Directory. Instead, the Complementary Act only makes it unlawful for a person to "possess for
sale in this state" cigarettes not listed on the Directory. l.C. § 39-8403(3)(b).
The Complementary Act only prohibits Maybee from "introduc[ing] non-compliant
, tobacco into the State" when he "knows or should know" these cigarettes are intended for
distribution or sale in the State. l.C. § 39-8403(3)(c). In other words, an out-of-state delivery
seller may be held liable under the Complementary Act if the seller knows or should know that
the consumer will re-distribute or re-sell the non-compliant cigarettes in the state (i.e., intrastate).
The undisputed facts in this case show that Maybee only sells cigarettes to consumers for their
personal use and consumption. (COE #6 iP 7; COE #9, Ex. J at !DAG 142978). Since Maybee
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does not sell cigarettes that are intended for distribution or sale in the State, he cannot be found
in violation of the Complementary Act.

3.

The Complementary Act Regulates Intrastate Delivery Sales.

Maybee does not claim that the MSA Act and the Complementary Act apply only to faceto-face sales, but not to delivery sales. On the contrary, the MSA Act and the Complementary
Act applies lo. all intrastate sales, including both intrastate face-to-face sales and intrastate
delivery sales.
While conceding that the MSA Act is inapplicable to interstate delivery sales, the State
asserts that the Legislature intended all delivery sales "to be subject to and in compliance with all
regulation of tobacco sales that exist for the more traditional ways in which tobacco products are
sold." (COE #8 at pp. 7, 23). We assume that the phrase "more traditional ways in which
tobacco products are sold" means face-to-face sales. To support its contention, the State cites to
a provision in the Minors' Access Act. (COE #8 at p. 7).
Section 39-5714 (2) of the Minors' Access Act provides that a delivery sale must comply
with certain specific provisions within that act, as well as:
all other laws of the state of Idaho generally applicable to sales of tobacco
products that occur entirely within Idaho including, but not limited to, those
laws imposing excise taxes, sales and use taxes, licensing and tax stamping
requirements and escrow or other payment obligations.
(Emphasis added). If interstate sellers were subject to the same rules as intrastate seller, then
interstate sellers would be required to sell only stamped cigarettes. See LC. § 63-2508. To
render such an interpretation, the Court would have to ignore other applicable federal and state
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laws.

See,~, Quill, 504 U.S. at 314; l.C. § 63-2512(b); IDAPA 35.01.10.013; IDAPA

35.01.10.022.

If cigarettes sold in interstate commerce are to be subject to the same laws as those sold
in intrastate commerce, then why does the State concede that unstamped cigarettes lawfully sold
in interstate commerce do not trigger to the application of the MSA Act? In enacting the MSA
Act, the Legislature specifically excludes unstamped cigarettes from the definition of "units
sold." Since non-participating manufacturers are only required to make escrow payments based
on the number of "units sold" in the State, Maybee's interstate delivery sales, as the State has
already conceded, do not trigger the application of the MSA Act. (COE# 8 at p. 23).
The State relies on § 39-5714(2) of the Minors' Access Act to support its unsupportable
claim that the Complementary Act regulates interstate delivery sales. To accomplish its desired
objective, the State completely ignores the plain language of the Complementary Act.

For

example, the Complementary Act, has 18 references to the MSA Act and no reference to the
Minors' Access Act. The Complementary Act specifically states that it was enacted to prevent
violations of the MSA Act and should be harmonized with the MSA Act with any conflict
between the two statutes to be controlled by the provisions of the MSA Act.
Since the State concedes that the MSA Act does not apply to interstate sales of
unstamped cigarettes, then the Court must find a way to harmonize the provisions of the
. Complementary Act and the Minors' Access Act with the provisions of the MSA Act. The most
logical interpretation of§ 5714(2) of the Minors' Access Act would be that all intrastate delivery
sales are subject to the same laws that are "generally applicable to sales of tobacco products that
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occur entirely within Idaho" in the "more traditional" intrastate face-to-face sales. In other
words, intrastate delivery sales are subject to the same laws and regulations as intrastate face-tofoce sales.
4.

The Court Must Construe the Complementary Act in a Manner that
Upholds its Constitutionality.

Another maxim of statutory construction is that "any doubt concemmg [the]
interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in favor of that which will render the statute
constitutional." McLean, 142 Idaho at 814, 135 P.3d at 760. The Court, therefore, must reject
any interpretation that suggests the Legislature acted in excess of its constitutional authority.
In Barilka Brewers, a federal court was called upon to interpret the phrase "in this state"
as used in the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. 443 F. Supp.2d at 318. The New
York statute required that all beer sold or delivered in New York State by a brewer to a
wholesaler must be' sold pursuant to a written franchise agreement. Id. at 321. The court was
called upon to interpret a provision, which defined "brewers" subject to the New York statute, as
"any person or entity engaged primarily in business as a brewer, manufacturer of alcoholic
beverages, importer, marketer, broker or agent of any of the foregoing who sells or offers to sell
beer to a beer wholesaler in this state or any successor to a brewer." Id. at 318.
The New York wholesaler claimed that a Russian brewery was subject to the statute
because it sold beer "to a beer wholesaler in this state." Id. at 318. The Russian brewery, on the
other hand, interpreted the New York statute to apply only to a brewery that "sells or offers to
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sell beer ... in this state." Id. The court initially found both interpretations to be reasonable and
thus the language to be ambiguous. Id. at 318-19.
In resolving the interpretation of the disputed text, the federal district court in Baltika
observed that:
statutory construction is a "holistic endeavor." United Sav'n Ass'n of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365 ... (1988) (Scalia, J.). Indeed, "a
provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder
of the statutory scheme-because the same tenninology is used elsewhere that
makes its meaning clear ... " (Id.). When taking a holistic approach Courts must
give every word meaning-statutory construction should not render some of the
text superfluous. (Citation omitted). Moreover, a Court should not reach an
interpretive result that is absurd.
443 F.Supp. 2d at 319. The court was, therefore, careful not to render an interpretation that
would raise "the specter of unconstitutionality." Id. at 319-320; accord McLean, 142 Idaho at
814, 135 P.3d at 760. Consequently, it rejected the interpretation that the New York statute was
intended to apply to "any transaction anywhere in the world with a licensed New York
wholesaler." Id. at 319.
A state's power to take action impacting interstate commerce is limited.

Id. "The

'Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place
wholly outside of the State's borders whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."'
Id. at 319-320 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324,336 (1989) and Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982)).

The court, therefore, concluded that the "only sensible

interpretation" to the New York statute is to limit its application to a brewery that "sells or offers
to sell beer ... in this state." Id. at 320. After rendering this interpretation, the court held that
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the New York statute was inapplicable to the "sales and deliveries" made by the Russian brewery
since such "sales and deliveries" take place at the point of shipment in Russia under U.C.C. § 2401. Id. at 322.
In this case, the State asserts that Maybee cannot provide to Idaho consumers cigarettes
not listed on the Directory, even if he sells, offer for sale and ships those cigarettes outside of
Idaho. The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of this interpretation would control
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State. Id. at 320 (quoting Healy. 491 U.S. at 336). Since
the Complementary Act cannot be given an interpretation that would run afoul of the donnant
Commerce Clause, the Court must find that it is only unlawful for a person to "sell, offer, or
possess" cigarettes not listed on the Directory "for sale in this state."

Guided by these

constitutional principles and by Idaho Code § 28-2-401(2)(a), this Court should conclude that
Maybee's delivery sales take place outside of Idaho and are not regulated by the Complementary
Act.

B.

The State is Preempted by the Indian Commerce Clause from Enforcing the
Provisions of the Complementary Act Against an Native American Delivery
Seller.

If, as the District Court found, "Maybee's compliance with the [Complementary Act] is
not dependent upon where the sale takes place, but is dependent only upon the taking of the
delivery sale order," then the Complementary Act seeks to regulate Maybee's on-reservation
acceptance of a delivery sale order. (R. 72). This assertion of state authority over on-reservation
conduct automatically raises the issue of federal preemption under the Indian Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution.
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Under the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress has been given plenary power to regulate
the affairs of Indians. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192. Since Congress is vested only with
this power, state law historically has had "no role to play" within reservation boundaries.
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 101 (2005); McClanahan v. Arizona
Tax Comm'n, 41 l U.S. 164, 168 (1973) ("[t]he policy of leaving Indian free from state
jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history."). Questions of pre-emption in
the area of Indian jurisprudence, therefore, are not resolved by reference to standards that have
developed in other areas of the Jaw. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176.
Although Congress has "acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no
power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation," pre-emption based on the Indian
Commerce Clause is "not limited to cases in which Congress has expressly - as compared to
impliedly-pre-empted the state activity." McCJanahan, 41 l U.S at 175 fnl3; Cotton Petroleum,
490 U.S. at 176-77. To safeguard Congress' latent powers from state encroachment, "[s)tate
laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where
Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply." McC!anahan, 411 U.S at 170-71.
Indian jurisprudence cases, however, "have not established an inflexible per se rule."
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-15. Instead, the United States Supreme Court has applied a flexible
pre-emption analysis, known as the Bracker interest-balancing test, which "requires a
particularized examination of the relevant state, federal and tribal interests." Bracker, 448 U.S.
at 143 (citing Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S.
832, 838 (I 982)). While state interests must be given weight, the pre-emption analysis requires,
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as a rule, any ambiguities to be resolved in favor of tribal independence. Cotton Petroleum, 490
U.S. at 177.
The analysis begins with two questions that "have significant consequences" relating to
pre-emption -- "who" is being regulated and "where" does the conduct being regulated take
place. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at I 01. With regards to the "where," the Supreme Court has stated that
"though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains an important factor to weigh in ,
determining whether state authority has exceeded the permissible limits." Bracker, 448 U.S. at
151. The Wagnon who/where test, as summarized in the table below, encapsulates prior United

States Supreme Court precedents challenging the exercise of state civil regulatory authority over
Indians or Indian reservations:
STATE AUTHORITY OVER
"The Who"

Indians

"The Where"
Off-reservation activities
On-reservation activities
When on-reservation conduct Absent express federal law
to the contrary, Indians
involving only Indians is at
issue, state laws are generally physically going beyond
reservation boundaries have
inapplicable, absent express
generally been held subject
congressional authority. The
to non-discriminatory state
state's regulatory interest is
law. 7
likely to be minimal and the
federal interest in encouraging
tribal self-fovernment is at its
strongest.

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (state could not impose personal property tax in the absence of
congressional consent); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U,S. 202 (1987) (state could prohibit a
tribe from operating a high-stake bingo enterprise on tribal land); Mcclanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164 (1973) (state could not impose income tax on income earned on the reservation by a tribal member); Moe v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (state could impose cigarette
taxes on sales made between tribal members; state could not impose a retail license requirement on a tribal
business); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (Congress permitted states to impose liquor licenses on tribal
businesses); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (state cannot impose motor fuel tax
on tribal businesses).
6
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ST ATE AUTHORITY OVER
"The Who"

Non-Indians

"The Where"
On-reservation activities
Off-reservation activities
The most difficult questions
Consistent with its
traditional police powers, a
arise where a state asserts
authority over on-reservation
state has the authority to
conduct of non-Indians. In
regulate the off-reservation
these instances, a state must
conduct of non-Indians that
have a significant regulatory
takes place within its state. 9
interest that outweig:hs federal
and tribal interests.

With regards to the "who" and the "where," the pre-emption analysis starts with a "fair
interpretation" of the statute, "as written and applied." Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 103.

7

New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Baker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916) (Indian are subject to state laws regarding offreservation fishing); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,4 l l U.S. 145 (1973) (state could impose a gross receipt tax
on off-reservation ski resort operated by a tribe); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (state had the authority to
conduct an on-reservation investigation relating to off-reservation crimes); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw
Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (state could impose income tax on income earned off the reservation); Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (I 962) (Indians are subject to state laws regarding off-reservation fishing);
Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game Wash., 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (same); Tu!ee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942)
(Indians are subject to state laws relating to off-reservation fishing, but are not subject to state fishing licenses);
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (Indians are subject to state laws regarding off-reservation hunting).
' Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (state cannot impose severance tax imposed on a
non-Indian oil and gas producer); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425
U.S. 463 (1976) (state can impose a minimum burden on tribal business to collect cigarette taxes on sale to nonIndians); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (state hunting and fishing laws do not apply
non-tribal members who hunt and fish on an Indian reservation); Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of
Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (state could not impose a gross receipt tax on a non-Indian contractor
that constructed a reservation school funded by the federal government); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (state could not impose a tax on Indian traders); White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state could not impose tax on non-Indian logging company); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959) (state courts lack jurisdiction to hear claims between a non-Indian and Indian involving onreservation transactions).
·
9

Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (state could impose tax on the off-reservation
receipt of motor fuel by on a non-Indian motor fuel distributor).
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1.

The State Seeks Only to Regulate the On-Reservation Conduct of an Out-ofState Native American.

There are four entities that facilitate a tobacco delivery sale:

(1) the tobacco

manufacturer or distributor who supplies tobacco products to the delivery seller; (2) the delivery
seller who sells, offers or possesses tobacco products for sale; (3) the customer who purchases
tobacco products; and (4) the delivery service that transports the tobacco products from the
delivery seller to the customer. In this case, the State seeks to assert authority over the onreservation conduct that involves only Maybee, an enrolled tribal member. Absent express
congressional authority, state laws are generally inapplicable "when on-reservation conduct
involving only Indians is at issue." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. Except for Maybee, the State does
not claim that the Complementary Act regulates any other entities facilitating a delivery sale in
interstate commerce.
The scope of the Complementary Act is limited to "cigarettes sold in this state" by a
tobacco manufacturer or any "wholesaler, distributor, retailer or similar intennediary or
intermediaries." See generally, I.C. § 39-8403. Idaho tax stamps are only required to be affixed
on cigarettes sold at retail in intrastate commerce. LC. § 63-2508. Idaho tax stamps, however,
are not affixed to cigarettes sold in interstate commerce. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314; LC. § 632512(b); IDAPA 35.01.10.013; IDAPA 35.01.10.022. Limited by the definition of"units sold,"
tobacco manufacturers are only subject to the provisions of the MSA Act and the
Complementary Act if their cigarettes are stamped and sold in this State. LC. § 39-8403(!).
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Consequently, the State must concede that Maybee's interstate sales of unstamped cigarettes do
not trigger any obligation of a tobacco manufacturer under the Complementary Act.
"[U]nder ce1iain circumstances, a State may validly assert authority over the activities of
nonmembers on a reservation .... " Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214-15 (emphasis added). Although

Maybee sells to Idaho consumers, the Complementary Act does not regulate the conduct of
consumers. Idaho consumers may "acquire, hold, own, possess, transport, import, or cause to be
imported cigarettes" not listed on the Directory for their own personal use and consumption. The
Complementary Act only makes it unlawful for a person to knowing! y distribute or sell noncompliant cigarettes in the State. LC. § 39-8403(3)(c). Since Idaho consumers acquire these
cigarettes from Maybee for their personal use and consumption and not for resale or distribution,
the Complementary Act does not regulate their conduct. Id. The Complementary Act, therefore,
does not purport to "assert authority over the activities of nonmembers [who purchase noncompliant cigarettes sold, offered and possessed for sale] on a reservation." Accord Cabazon,
480 U.S. at 214-15.
The State also lacks the authority to regulate the activities of the United States Postal
Services or common carriers that transport cigarettes in interstate commerce.

Johnson v.

Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (I 920); Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n, _U.S._, 128
S. Ct. 989 (2008). In Johnson, Justice Holmes finnly established that states have no power to
control the instrumentalities of the United States through state laws that would regulate an
employee of the United States Postal Services in the performance of his official duties. 254 U.S.
at 57. In Rowe, the United States Supreme Court recently held that Congress, in enacting the
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Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, pre-empted states from imposing liability,
based on constructive knowledge, on a common carrier that transported packages containing
contraband tobacco. 128 S. Ct. at 996. Rowe further held that states cannot impose regulations
on a common carrier that might affect its rates, route or service, even if such state regulations
relate to tobacco and are in furtherance of public health.

Id. at 998.

Consequently, the

provisions of the Complementary Act are inapplicable to activities conducted by the U.S. Postal
Services or a common carrier.
The conduct at issue in this case, therefore, involves only Maybee, an enrolled tribal
member who makes delivery sales without leaving his place of business on an out-of-state Indian
reservation.

Absent express congressional authority, the State has the burden to show that

Maybee's on-reservation conduct has off-reservation effects that impairs a significant state
interest sought to be protected by the Complementary Act. Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 336. The
State, as a matter oflaw, has not met its constitutional burden.
2.

The State Cannot Show An Off-Reservation Effect that Impairs a
Significant Interest Warranting State Regulation or Intervention.

Before the District Court, the State argued that Maybee's conduct triggers the application
of the Complementary Act when he "introduces noncompliant tobacco into the State" by mailing
them to Idaho consumers. (COE #8 at pp. 10, 13). The State mischaracterized this conduct as
"off-reservation activity" even though Maybee never leaves his reservation during any stage of
the sale transaction. (COE #6 iJ25). Consumer orders and payments are received by Maybee at
his place of business on the reservation.
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reservation. (Id. '1[25). The State has no authority to regulate mail being delivered into the State,
but claims to have authority to "limit [Maybee's] ability to introduce non-compliant tobacco into
the State." (COE #8 at p. 13). The State, therefore, seeks to prevent Maybee from mailing
cigarettes not listed on the Directory to Idaho consumers - an on-reservation activity.
The State has failed to allege or to show that Maybee's on-reservation conduct has offreservation effects that impair a significant interest intended to be protected by the
Complementary Act. As we have repeatedly stated, the Legislature enacted the Complementary
Act as a "procedural enhancement" to the enforcement of the MSA Act.

LC. § 39-840 !. The

Legislature intended the MSA Act and the Complementary Act to protect "the integrity of
Idaho's master settlement agreement with leading tobacco product manufacturers, the fiscal
soundness of the state, and the public health." Compare LC. § 39-8401 with LC. 39-7801.
Maybee's on-reservation conduct does not threaten any of these interests.
The primary goal of the Complementary Act is to prevent violations of the MSA Act.
LC. § 39-8401. The MSA Act imposes obligation only on "tobacco manufacturers selling
cigarettes to consumers within the state." 10 I.C. § 39-7803. Since Maybee is not a tobacco
manufacturer, any conduct on his part would not violate the provisions of the MSA Act. More
importantly, the State has conceded that Maybee's sale of unstamped cigarettes does not affect
the escrow obligations of non-participating tobacco manufacturers under the MSA Act. (COE #8
at p. 23). Although Maybee's on-reservation conduct has the off-reservation effect of
" Citing to a section that has been repealed, the District Court mistakenly asserted that the MSA Act imposes
obligations on wholesalers, distributors and stamping agents. (R. 41 ). Sections 39-7804 and 39-7805 of the MSA
Act were repealed after the Legislature enacted the Complementary Act. The MSA Act only imposes obligations on
tobacco manufacturers.
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"introduc[ing] ... in the State" cigarettes not listed on the Directory, this off-reservation effect
causes no violation to the MSA Act.
The State also failed to show how Maybee' s conduct has the effect of threatening "the
integrity" of the Master Settlement Agreement with leading tobacco manufacturers. Under the
terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, Idaho is obligated to diligently enforce its MSA Act.
Since non-participating manufacturers are not obligated to make escrow payments based on
Maybee's sales, the State cannot claim that Maybee's sales affect its ability to diligently enforce
the MSA Act, as required by the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement. Additionally, the
State has failed to show or allege that Maybee's conduct has any effect on the "integrity" or
obligations of the settling parties to the Master Settlement Agreement.
The MSA Act was enacted to "effectively and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantage that
Participating Manufacturers experience vis-a-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers within such
Settling States as a result of the provisions" of the Master Settlement Agreement. (COE #7, Ex.
D 133). By selling brands manufactured by non-participating manufacturers, Maybee's sales
may have the off-reservation effect of reducing sales of brands manufactured by the participating
manufacturer. As Philip Morris, the Nation's largest tobacco manufacturers, has observed, "a
key distinction" between Native American delivery sellers and other delivery sellers is that
Native American delivery sellers:
use the Internet to gain a broad geographical reach for brands they manufacture.
Some examples of Native American-manufactured brands include Seneca, Native
and Skydancer.
(COE #7, Ex.Fat IDAG139654). Even though Maybee has sold cigarettes manufactured by
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Native Americans and other non-participating manufacturers to Idaho consumers, the State must
show that this off-reservation effect impairs a significant state interest.

Protecting private

tobacco companies from competition is not a legitimate state interest and cannot be justified as
the exercise of the State's police power relating to the health, safety and welfare of its citizens.
Under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, participating manufacturers are
obligated "to pay substantial sums to the state (tied in part to their volume of sales)" in exchange
for releases of past, present and certain future claims. I.C. § 39-7801(e). Arguably, Maybee's
sales might displace brands sold by participating manufacturers, causing MSA payments made
by these participating manufacturers to be reduced.

But the State does not claim that this

potential off-reservation effect threatens "the fiscal soundness of the state." As the State has
conceded, "[w]hether Defendant's [alleged] illegal cigarette sales threaten Idaho's fiscal
soundness is not at issue" in this case. (COE #8 at p. 24).
In enacting the MSA Act, the Legislature found that:
Cigarette smoking ... presents serious financial concerns for the state. Under
certain health-care programs, the state may have a legal obligation to provide
medical assistance to eligible persons for health conditions association with
cigarette smoking....
I.C. § 39-7801. Despite these findings, neither the MSA Act nor the Complementary Act bans

the sale or use of cigarettes in the State in furtherance of public health.
Idaho and other states sought to have these "finaucial burdens imposed on the state by
cigarette smoking borne by tobacco manufacturers, rather than by the state." LC.§ 39-780l(d).
Of course, the State could have easily accomplished this objective by increasing the cigarette
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excise tax on all cigarettes sold or used in the State. Instead, the State filed a lawsuit against the
Nation's four largest tobacco companies that were responsible for 99.58350% of all cigarettes
sold in the United States (i.e., Phillip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard and Brown &
Williamson). Accord LC. § 39-780l(e); (COE #7, Ex.D "il"il 15, 27). On November 23, 1998,
these leading manufacturers settled various lawsuits and obtained releases of past, present and
certain claims alleging culpable conduct on the part of these manufacturers. These participating
manufacturers also agreed to "pay substantial sums to the state" and, in exchange, the State
agreed to enact and diligently enforce the MSA Act.
Under the MSA Act, the non-participating manufacturers are obligated to make escrow
payments based on the number of units sold in the State so that,

"if they are proven to have acted

culpably," the State may have a source of a recovery against these non-participating
manufacturers in the future. LC.§ 39-780l(d), (f). The State has alleged no culpable conduct on
the part of any non-participating manufacturers whose brands are not certified for sale in the
State, but are sold by Maybee. More importantly, the United State Supreme Court has held that a
state cannot speculate to possible or future off-reservation effects to sustain a claim that a state
has regulatory authority over on-reservation conduct. See,

Q&,

Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 336;

Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 220-21 (1987).
In Mescalero, New Mexico attempted to enforce state hunting and fishing laws against
non-tribal members on tribal land. The Supreme Court stated that a "State's regulatory interest
will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate
state intervention." 462 U.S. at 336. Although that case involved the on-reservation conduct of
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non-tribal members, the same standard can be used for on-reservation conduct of tribal members,
which produces off-reservation effects.
To justify the exercise of state authority, New Mexico claimed in Mescalero that it had an
interest in the wildlife conservation and in the collection of state licensing fees. Id. at 342-43.
New Mexico, however, conceded that on-reservation hunting by tribal and non-tribal members
had no adverse impact on fish and wildlife outside the reservation. Id. at 342. New Mexico's
"general desire to obtain revenue" from the collection of licensing fees was, in the Court's view,
"inadequate to justify the assertion of concurrent jurisdiction" with the tribe. Id. at 343. Even
though New Mexico could point to a potential off-reservation effect, the Court ruled that those
possible effects were not sufficient to justify state intervention to regulate the on-reservation
conduct of even non-tribal members. Id. at 342-343.
In Cabazon, California's sole interest to justify the imposition of its state gaming laws on
tribal gambling enterprises was the possibility that high stakes gaming might attract organized
crime. 480 U.S. at 220-2 l. California did not allege "any present criminal involvement" with
these tribal gambling enterprises. Id. at 22 l. The Supreme Court was unconvinced that such
remote interests were "sufficient to escape the pre-emptive force of federal and tribal interests"
implicated in that case. Id.
In this case, the State has not alleged or presented any evidence that Native American or
other non-participating manufacturers have engaged in any conduct from which they could be
"found culpable by the courts." LC. § 39-780l(d). More importantly, both the MSA Act and the
Complemei1tary Act only require non-participating; manufacturers to make escrow payment if
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their cigarettes are sold in the State. Consequently, the State's "eventual source of recovery"
from these non-participating manufacturers

"if they are proven to have acted culpably,'' would

not include escrow payments based on "units used" in the State, as opposed to "units sold in this
state." Maybee's sales, therefore have no off-reservation effect that impairs any current or future
interest sought to be protected by either the MSA Act or the Complementary Act.
Finally, the State has not alleged or shown why the sale of "non-compliant" cigarettes
threatens the public health any more than the sale of "compliant" cigarettes. Cigarette brands
listed on the Directory are not Jess addictive or dangerous to smokers. Cigarettes are listed only
because the manufacturer has filed with the Attorney General non-health related information on
an annual certification. The State, therefore, cannot show that Maybee's on-reservation conduct
has an off-reservation effect sought to be regulated by the Complementary Act.
As a matter of Jaw, the District Court erred in granting the State's motion for summary
judgment and in enjoining Maybee from selling or offering to sell cigarettes not listed on the
Directory to Idaho consumers from his place of business on the Seneca Nation Allegany Indian
Territory. For the reasons stated in Point I, we respectfully request that paragraphs 1, 3, 4, and 5
of the Judgment entered against Maybee on February 26, 2006 be reversed and that the District
Court be directed to dismiss the State's first cause of action in its complaint claiming violations
of the Complementary Act.
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POINT II
THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE PREEMPTS THE
MINORS' ACCESS ACT FROM IMPOSING A PERMIT
ON A NATIVE AMERICAN DELIVERY SELLER

In its second cause of action, the State alleges that Maybee has violated the Minors'
Access Act by selling cigarettes at retail to Idaho consumers without first possessing the state
tobacco permit. (R. 17-18 if45). Again we begin the pre-emption analysis with a "fair
interpretation" of the relevant provisions of the Minors' Access Act, "as written and applied," to
determine "who" is being regulated and "where" does the conduct being regulated take place.
Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 101,103.

A.

The State Seeks to Regulate On-Reservation Sales of A Native American
Tobacco Seller By Requiring a Permit Prior to Malting A Delivery Sale.

The Minors' Access Act provides that "(p]rior to making delivery sales or shipping
tobacco products in connection with such sales," a delivery seller must obtain a state tobacco
permit. LC.§ 39-5718(1). The Wagnon who/where test is easily answered by the statute's plain
language. The permit requirement is imposed on a delivery seller "who," in this case, is Maybee,
an enrolled tribal member. It further states that a permit must be obtained "[p]rior to making
delivery sales or shipping tobacco products in connection with such sales." Id. Without a
permit, a delivery seller cannot accept an order from or ship cigarettes to an Idaho consumer. Id.
Since orders are received, accepted and mailed on the reservation, the permit requirement of the
Minors' Access Act attempts to regulate Maybee's conduct on the reservation.
The fact that the permit requirements apply to all tobacco retailers does not alter the pre-
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emption analysis. Non-discriminatory state Jaws can still be pre-empted if such Jaws assert
authority over the on-reservation conduct involving only lndians. 11 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144.
"When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally
inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." Id. For the State to overcome this strong
presumption, it must show that Congress granted it civil regulatory authority over out-of-state
reservation sellers who ship tobacco products to Idaho consumers or that it has a significant
interest warranting state intervention. In this case, the State has shown neither.
B.

Congress Has Not Authorized the State to Regulate On-Reservation Tobacco
Sales of an Out-of-State Native American.

The State's police powers are generally presumed not to apply to on-reservation conduct
of tribal members. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144. An act of Congress, however, can overcome this
presumption by delegating civil regulatory authority to the State. See, ~, Rice v. Rehner, 463
U.S. 713 (1983).

1.

State Liquor Laws Versus State Tobacco Laws.

The District Court found that Maybee was required to obtain a state-issued permit prior to
making a delivery sale to an Idaho consumer. (R. 47). It cited to Rice for support. (Id.).
In Rice, the United States Supreme Court found that "Congress ha[d] delegated authority
to the States as well as to the Indian tribes to regulate the use and distribution of alcoholic
beverages in Indian country .... " Id. at 715. By enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1161, Congress removed

11

See cases cited in footnote 6.

Boise-215497.1 0036346-00002

62

the 1832 federal prohibition that made it illegal to give, distribute or sell alcohol to an Indian. Id.
at 726. Section 1161 provides that liquor transactions must be "in conformity both with the laws
of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the
tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country .... " Id. at 715. The United States
Supreme Court held that Congress intended state laws to govern tribal liquor transactions as long
as the tribe itself approved such transactions by enacting an ordinance. Id. at 726.
Although § 1161 did not explicitly impose state licensing requirements on reservation
sellers, the Rice Court ruled that Congress had authorized state liquor regulations that required a
reservation business to obtain a state liquor license before selling alcohol to non-Indians for offpremises consumption. Id. at 726. The Court, therefore, ruled that a reservation seller was
required to obtain a California liquor license.
In Rice, the United States Supreme Court observed that "in Indian matters, Congress
usually acts 'upon the assumption that States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on
a reservation.'" Id. at 723, quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). This assumption,
as the Court further observed, is "unwarranted in the narrow context of the regulation of liquor."
Id. at 723.
[T]radition simply has not recognized sovereign immunity or inherent authority in
favor of liquor regulation by Indians. The colonists regulated Indian liquor
trading before this Nation was formed, and Congress exercised its authority over
these transactions as early as 1802.
Id. at 722.

In short, the Rice holding has no applicability outside "the narrow context of

regulation of liquor."
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Unlike tobacco, Native Americans first acquired alcohol from European settlers. Felix S.
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 352 (Government Printing Office 1948). Because
alcohol was never introduced into Indian society until the arrival of the white settlers, Indians
had no tolerance for alcohol. Id. Native Americans believe that consumption of alcohol allowed
"spirits" to enter their bodies. Indian tribes at various times sought to curb the consumption of
this "fatal poison." Id. The first federal law prohibiting the sale of alcohol to Indians was
enacted, at least in part, in response to the verbal plea of an Indian chief to President Thomas
Jefferson. Id.
Tobacco, on the other hand, was introduced to European settlers by Native Americans.
Historically, Native Americans used tobacco not only as a commodity of trade, but also for
ceremonial purposes. The sharing of the peace pipe symbolized the accord reached between and
among tribal nations, or between and among t.ribal nations and foreign governments in forming
treaties and other alliances. Tradition has recognized the inherent authority oflndians to regulate
tobacco.
2.

Federal Tobacco Laws.

Unlike the regulation of alcohol, Congress has not authorized states to regulate tobacco
sales on Indian reservation.

In the last five years, several bills have been introduced into

Congress that would expand the civil enforcement powers of states to regulate reservation
tobacco sales. 12 Other congressional bills have been introduced to ban delivery sales by making

See H.R. 1839, 108 th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (entitled "Youth Smoking Prevention and State Revenue
Enforcement Act"); S. 1177, 108 th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (entitled "PACT Act'} H.R. 2824, 108 th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2003) (entitled "Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act"); H.R. 3749, 108' Cong., 2"' Sess. (2004) (entitled
12
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cigarettes and certain other tobacco products umnailable. 13 Congress has not passed any of these
bills.

In 2006, Congress amended the provisions of the Cigarette Contraband Trafficking Act
("CCTA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2341 et seq.

The amendments lowered the threshold definition for

"contraband" for federal intervention and expanded civil enforcement of the CCT A to include
state attorneys general and local governments. 18 U.S.C. § 2341 (contraband threshold changed
from 60,000 taxable, unstamped cigarettes to 10,000 taxable, unstamped cigarettes); 18 U.S.C. §
2346(b)(I), (2) (civil enforcement expanded to allow state attorneys general and local
government to seek injunctive relief and civil penalties against violators). Importantly, Congress
did not pennit state attorneys general or local governments to seek civil enforcement against "an
Indian tribe or an Indian in Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 2346(b)(l), (2). The amendments
specifically stated that:
[n]othing in this chapter shall be deemed to abrogate or constitute a waiver of any
sovereign immunity of ... an Indian tribe against any unconsented lawsuit under
this chapter, or otherwise to restrict, expand, or modify any sovereign immunity
of ... an Indian tribe.
18 U.S.C. § 2346(b)(2). These amendments demonstrate that Congress has not allowed states to
exercise jurisdiction over tobacco sales conducted on Indian reservations.

"Local Government Internet Tobacco Sales Enforcement Act of 2004"); S. 3810, 109 th Cong., 2"' Sess. (2006)
(entitled "PACT Act"); S. 1027, 110th Cong., !st Sess. (2007) (entitled "PACT Act"); H.R. 4081, I 10 th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2007) (entitled "PACT Act" and same as S. 1027). All congressional bills with summary, text and status are
available online at http://www.govtrack.us/.
13

See H.R. 2813, 109 th Cong., I" Sess. (2005); H.R. 2932, 110 th Cong., I" Sess. (2007); S. 1027, 110 th Cong., 1st
Sess. (2007) (entitled "PACT Act"); H.R. 4081, 110 th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (entitled "PACT Act" and same as S.
1027).
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Congress has given the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") the exclusive power and
authority to make regulations, specifying the kind, quantity and price of goods that can be sold to
Indians on an Indian reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 261. BIA, therefore, has the sole authority to
regulate the sale, distribution and shipment of tobacco products to an Indian reservation.

The

United States Supreme Court has held that "Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on
reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional burdens."
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965). The Indian Trader
Statutes, therefore, pre-empt any state law that would restrict the kind, quantity or price of
tobacco products sold to an Indian tribe or its members. If every Settling State, by enacting a
qualifying statute, attempted to restrict the kind, quantity, and price on cigarettes sold at
wholesale on an Indian reservation, then such state laws would conflict with the exclusive
authority given to the BIA under the Indian Trader Statutes.
By examining Title 25 of the United States Code, the Court can observe "Congress' firm
commitment to the encouragement of tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."
Accord Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 334.
Self-determination and economic development are not within reach if the Tribes
cannot raise revenues and provide employment for their members. The Tribes'
interests obviously parallel the federal interests.
Cabazon, 480 at 219.

Maybee's business creates revenue for his tribe and jobs on his

reservation, thereby furthering tribal and federal interests of promoting self-sufficiency and
economic development.
In sum, Congress has shown that it is not supportive of expanding the State's civil
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regulatory authority over tobacco sales from Indian reservations. First, Congress has granted the
BIA exclusive power and authority over tobacco products that can be sold to an Indian
reservation. Second, the CCTA amendments specifically preclude state enforcement on Indian
reservations. Finally, Congress has rejected bills proposing the expansion of state authority over
tobacco sales on Indian reservations. These facts are evidence of a federal policy that pre-empts
the State from enforcing its civil tobacco laws on an out-of-state Indian reservation without
specific federal legislation.

C.

Idaho Would Not Be the First State Pre-empted from Imposing a Permit or
License on a Native American Tobacco Seller.

Idaho is not the first state to have sought to impose a permit or licensing requirement on a
reservation tobacco seller. A three-judge district court held that the State of Montana could not
impose licensing requirement on a private Native American tobacco retailer.

Confederated

Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 392 F. Supp. at 1312, affd, 425 U.S. 463, 480-481. In that case,
deputy sheriffs arrested a member of a tribal nation for failing to possess a Montana cigarette
retail license and for selling unstamped cigarettes. 425 U.S. at 467. Both the tribe and the tribal
member sued the State of Montana challenging the applicability of the Montana cigarette tax and
licensing statutes to tribal members who sell cigarettes from an Indian reservation. Id. at 467468.
Montana conceded that it lacked the authority to tax sales between individual tribal
members.

Confederated Saiish and Kootenai Tribes, 392 F. Supp. at 1307 n. 18. Instead,
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Montana asserted that it had the authority to impose a retail license if reservation sellers sold
tobacco products at retail to non-Indians.
The arrested tribal member sold tobacco products not only to members of his tribe, but
also to non-Indians for their off-reservation use. 392 F. Supp. at 1311 ("It may reasonably be
inferred that the stores were not established primarily for the benefit of Indian customers residing
on the Reservation, but rather to sell cigarettes to prospective customers passing on the highway
and others who come from neighboring communities to purchase cigarettes at a price
substantially lower than the going price off the Reservation."). In an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief, the federal district court ruled that a tribal member could not be compelled to
obtain a state retail license. 392 F. Supp. at 1312. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
this holding on the ground of federal pre-emption. 425 U.S. at 480-481.
Maybee's delivery sales cannot be distinguished from the face-to-face sales made by the
Native American smokeshop owner in Moe.

Both conduct retail sales without leaving their

reservations. Both sell tobacco products to non-Indian consumers for their off-reservation use.
Neither is involved in the transporting of tobacco products off the reservation.

In Moe,

consumers transported the product off the reservation, and in this case, the United States Postal
Service ships the product off the reservation. In Moe, the tribal retainer benefited from the state
highways that pass by the reservation bringing off-reservation consumers to his smokeshop. In
this case, Maybee benefits from the information superhighway (i.e. the Internet) that attracts
consumers to his on-reservation business.
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The State can only distinguish the facts in Moe from the facts in this case by showing that
Maybee's delivery sales have off-reservation effects that did not exist in the face-to-face sales
made by the smokeshop owner in Moe. Maybee asserts that his delivery sales have no offreservation effects that impair a significant state interest sought to be protected by the Minors'
Access Act. In fact, Maybee can prove that his delivery sales further the State's interests, more
than face-to-face sales.

The State, therefore, cannot show any off-reservation effect that

necessities state regulation or judicial intervention.

D.

Maybee's On-Reservation Delivery Sales Have No Off-Reservation Effects
that Necessitate the Imposition of a Permit.

The Legislature enacted the Minors' Access Act "to prevent the illegal sale, theft and
easy access of tobacco products to minors and to prohibit the possession, distribution and use of
tobacco products by minors." LC. § 39-5701. Under the Minors' Access Act, delivery sales are
subject to certain state requirements. LC. § 39-5714. Maybee is only alleged to have violated
one of these state requirements - selling tobacco product without a state tobacco pennit. The
Minors' Access Act declares that the sale or distribution of tobacco products without a permit "is
considered by the state of Idaho as an effort to subvert the state's public purpose to prevent
minor's access to tobacco products." LC. § 39-5709.
According to the State, "[t]he permit requirement contributes to the State's effort at
controlling the ability of minors to obtain tobacco by ensuring that [the State] has a central
repository of all businesses marketing tobacco to Idaho residents with a uniform set of data
which facilitates compliance monitoring and, where necessary, enforcement actions." (COE # 8
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at p. 18). Delivery sellers are required under the Minors' Access Act to "file with the state tax
commission a statement setting forth the seller's name, trade name and the address of the
business's principal place of business and any other place of business." LC.§ 39-5718(1). The
Jenkins Act similarly requires an out-of-state delivery seller to

"file with the tobacco tax

administrator of the State into which such shipment is made ... a statement setting forth his
name and trade name (if any), and the address of his principal place of business and of any other
place of business." 15 U.S.C. § 376(a)(I). Consequently, Maybee has already provided the
State with this same information required by the Minors' Access Act, by complying with the
Jenkins Act.
The State has a significant interest in preventing youth access to tobacco. In Rowe,
Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion, raised concerns that "State measures to prevent
youth access to tobacco ... are increasingly thwarted by the ease with which tobacco products
can be purchased through the Internet." 128 S. Ct. at_. These concerns relate to the more than
1800 websites offering to sell tobacco products, which do not report their sales to states, but do
not relate to responsible delivery sellers who do report their sales. (COE #7, Ex. F at IDAG
139650).
The State does not disputed the fact that Maybee sells only to adult consumers for their
personal use or that he reports all delivery sales, as required by Jenkins Act, to the State. (COE
#6, ,i,i 17, 29). The State does not claim that Maybee has sold tobacco to minors or that his age
verification procedures are inadequate to prevent youth access.

As Maybee has repeatedly

stated, he verifies the name, address and age of each Idaho consumer before he accepts an order
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for a delivery sale. (COE #6 ,r2 I). Maybee also informs Idaho consumers that it is illegal to sell
or give tobacco products to minors. (COE #6, if29, Ex. A).
The Center for Disease Control 2004 National Youth Tobacco Survey14 found that
minors purchase more cigarettes through vending machines than through Internet sales. More
importantly, the survey showed that brick-and-mortar stores remain the overwhelming retail
source for minors to purchase cigarettes illegally. According to the CDC study, minors who
purchased cigarettes within the last 30 days of the survey stated that 63.5% of these purchases
came from gas stations, convenience stores, grocery stores or drug stores. Vending machines
accounted for 2.8%, while Internet sales only account for 2.3%.
Between 2002 and 2007, multistate investigations have revealed that national retail
chains, all of whom held multiple state licenses and permits, routinely made tobacco sales to
minors. These investigations resulted in, at least, ten multistate settlement agreements 15 with
various corporations, including 7 Eleven, Inc., CVS Pharmacy, Rite Aid Corporation, Walgreens,
Wal-Mart and Exxon Mobile Corporation. State Attorneys General found these retail giants
made tobacco sales to minors at retail outlets located throughout the nation. Between 28 and 46
states, including Idaho, were parties to these multistate settlement agreements. Civil penalties in
these agreements ranged between $ I 00,000 and $437,500, with settlement proceeds being
distributed among the settling states. These assurances, along with the CDC study, prove that

14 The Center for Disease Control 2004 National Youth Tobacco Survey is available online at
htlJ)://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/surveys/NYTS/index.htm.

15 Copies of these Assurances of Voluntary Compliance are available for review online at
htlJ):l/www.responsiblesellers.org/avc/
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face-to-face transactions do not ensure that only adults have access to tobacco.
The State will no doubt argue that its ability to suspend or to revoke a tobacco permit
deters retailers from making sales to minors. However, this deterrent effect had no impact on
those national retail chains that were found to have routinely made tobacco sales to minors. In
each instance, State Attorneys General did not seek to revoke or suspend these retail giants'
licenses or permits. Instead, they focused their efforts into negotiating civil agreements that
proscribed "best practices" for future tobacco sales.
Maybee has adopted and implemented age-verification standards that effectively ensure
that his delivery sales are not made to minors. (COE 6, Ex. A). The State has the ability to
monitor and detect illegal sales by independently verifying the age of each customer whose name
and address are given by Maybee to the State each month. Because face-to-face transactions are
completed within seconds, the State has no mechanism to detect illegal sales after these sales
have been completed.

As it does with face-to-face sales, the State can conduct random,

unannounced compliance checks to test Maybee's business practices to ensure that he is not
selling tobacco to minors. These compliance checks can be conducted regardless of whether he
has a permit or not. The State has more effective means to monitor Maybee's compliance than
simply requiring him to obtain a permit. The State could, for example, use the same degree of
effort, as it has used in this case, to seek fines, penalties or injunctive relief against Maybee
when, if ever, it has evidence that Maybee has made an illegal sale to a minor. A state permit
requirement, therefore, serves no legitimate regulatory purpose that cannot otherwise be
achieved through other less intrusive means.
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The State has failed to show that Maybee's conduct has off-reservation effects that
impairs a significant state interest sought to be protected by the Minors' Access Act. As a matter
of law, the District Court should have denied the State's motion for summary judgment and
granted Maybee's cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated in Point II, we
respectfully request that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Judgment entered against Maybee on February
26, 2006 be reversed and that the District Court be directed to dismiss the State's second cause of

action in its complaint alleging violations of the Minors' Access Act.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Appellant Maybee request that the Judgment entered
against him on February 26, 2006 be reversed and that the District Court be directed to dismiss
the State's complaint against him.
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